

## MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

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**Abstract:** *The history of diplomacy can be divided in three main periods: one is that of occasional diplomacy peculiar to Middle Ages, while other belong to permanent diplomacy, peculiar to modern times. But this one can be divided in two parts, too: one with a bilateral character, previous to 1<sup>st</sup> World War, and one with a multilateral character, manifested especially after the end of 1<sup>st</sup> World War. This third type is the focus of present paper. And it cannot be separated from the newly international constructs: international regimes, and international organizations. International institutions – the area where international regimes are belonging to – are legal constructs which provide the formal (and) legal framework for continuous negotiations. They are the most visible part of the new diplomacy – the one which has a permanent character, and it has an more open face. Anyway, the most important connection has to do with the international institutions, international regimes, and multilateral international negotiations. In the era of the new diplomacy, they all have a permanent character. International institutions help international negotiations' carrying on; while in their turn, they provide the base for international regimes' creation, and especially for their evolution. The international regimes' evolution is an inseparable part of a permanent international framework. And if there is missing a permanent international framework (international organization) connected to a specific regime, this regime is a diffuse one, its members have only informal relations among them, while they survey each other, looking at their behavior, but they don't have a formal relationship among them, which could help them solving their future common interests, and protect them from their common fears. International regimes are very important in the era when everything touches, and influences everything. In the same time, the complexity of our present world can be successfully handled only by common efforts made by all interested states. International regimes are made from two main parts: one regards the principles, norms, rules, and procedures peculiar to a specific international area, while the other has to do with the evolutionary process of these regimes – sustained by a permanent organizational framework, and permanent negotiations. They help their members to attain their goals in conditions of uncertainty, without arriving at such a tensions as to degenerate in war. Looking them through in this angle, international regimes can be regarded as peaceful means for advancing states' interests.*

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There are three steps in the history of diplomacy. The first one regards the disrupted diplomacy specific to Middle Age, when embassies had an irregular form; the second one regards the period between Middle Ages and the first part of 21<sup>st</sup> century, while the last one started after World War 2.

For the second part of the great history of diplomacy, there was a normal thing to have *only secret* channels of contacts between states through ambassadors – which were accredited for a short or a longer mission abroad; after 1919, there appeared what we normally call open diplomacy. This does not mean that all details negotiated are

presented to the public, at large, but the result of debates is public presented. With this, diplomacy has entered a public sphere; and it is called an open diplomacy. Of course, not all details are presented to the general public, and it is not keep informed about all aspects of negotiations, but from time to time, there is some public debates and presentations concerning the subject of negotiations.

Of course, there are some subjects of negotiations which need a large audience in order to bring support for a peculiar cause, while other are still kept in the greatest secret... If negotiations belonging to the first group are negotiations concerning global population, and its possible trends, education, health, *environment* and climate changes, the negotiations carried on in the UN Security Council, or those concerning an arms' transfer, or arms' production, belonged to the second type,

Anyway, there is more openness today than in the past, and although there is a lot of information to keep us alert with international evolution, there can appear a "suffocation" effect given by too much information which can be very difficult to manage. Today we have great access, but there is too much information, and too much information channels to select...

In this context, *international institutions* help international system to work smoothly, and sustain it through the creation of the needed framework for *international regimes'* building. These regimes are indispensable for 20-st, and especially for the 21-st century world; while they are compulsory for *multilateral diplomacy* to work smoothly. They help states to solve problems with international (and global) implications which are rooted in common interests, or common fears.

In this moment we can easy note that there appeared a new type of diplomatist, one which is not preoccupied especially with political affairs as he had been before 1919, and whose characteristics are well detailed by de Callieres and re-detailed focusing on that reference by Waquet (2005); instead he has become a *specialist*, being focused upon different aspects of problems with international character.

And as one easy can note, transportations (and communications in general) have a genuinely international character. It is not a hazard that the first created international institutions were focused on international communications and post sending. Both of them sprang after the multilateral talks were held in Paris, after 1850.

After that, and especially after 1919, when the League of Nations was created, there has become impossible to speak about globalization without bring into debate international institutions, and their unmistakable effect: international regimes.

Studying the history of diplomacy, one could note that it could be delimited into two main periods: one commencing in ancient times ending at the end of the 15-th century, while the other starts in that period, and runs into present times; it is characterized by the permanent diplomacy's appearance and the accreditation and the improvement of diplomatic methods and institutions. This new type of diplomacy has in its greatest part a bilateral form – it is the "classical" or "traditional" diplomacy. But starting with the 19-th century, there could be identified and recognized a new division here: there is a "new diplomacy", as a part of the permanent diplomacy – it is the *multilateral diplomacy*.

Lord Hankey mentioned that 1914 was the year when diplomacy started to take place under the conferences' umbrellas (Malița, 1975: 319). As was pointed by Nicolson (1955), the appearance of this new type of diplomacy promoted by W. Wilson in 1914 represented the continuation of conflict peculiar to 19-th century, concerning the opposition between the common interests of humankind, and the exclusive national rights. The "progress of diplomatic theory has manifested starting with the conception of exclusive tribal rights, ending in a more comprehensive conception – that of inclusive common interests (Nicolson, 2005).

The division of labor (at domestic and international levels), the appearance of new technologies which helped man to control space and nature, which reflected themselves

in new transportations means, have played a decisive role in rising interdependence among states, at global stage. Exactly this greater interdependence has generated changes regarding diplomatic practices, and negotiations – which are, as Malița points out (2007), the core of diplomacy.

In the same context, multilateral diplomacy became the norm, while the exception had to be reserved to bilateral diplomacy; and some peculiarities of these negotiations carried on at international level have started to influence their character, and their results.

Some norms and principles started to guide the thinking of key-policy makers, and the way negotiations were carried on during pre-negotiations phase, during negotiations *per se*, but especially after the negotiations ended, during post-negotiations period.

These new elements which were brought in by convergent expectations and similar behaviors gave birth to social institutions which could be “covered” under the aegis of an agreement; but afterwards they influenced a lot signatory states’ actions, during the post-agreement phase.

Those actions regard the agreement’s conclusion at the end of proper negotiations, when participants agree to a formula, while during post-negotiations phase the details follow to be debated, identified, and agreed to. The formula had success if it works for specific cases; it helps providing a guide for different problems (Zartman and Berman, 1982).

The formula establishes, and provides the criteria on which is based the future problems’ solving.

Sometimes, the negotiations cannot give shape to details using the formula’s framework, thus being directed to reformulate the framework, in order to provide the necessary peculiarities to implement it successfully. There were cases when a quick arrived at formula needs a great span of time for detailed aspects to be found and implemented, and only passing through a difficult and complex process. The advantage for participants is that they communicate and learn together (both from others, and from themselves experience).

These processes are facilitated if there is a framework which provides an efficient and permanent contact among the parties which intend to find together a solution for the problems they face.

As a consequence, between these negotiations and the framework where they take place establishes a very strong and stable connection, which has a great importance. The framework existence ensures the continuity of negotiations process; while any change which could influence the results arrived at before could be “managed” as to absorb tensions and changes to fit a new context. This framework could be presented as international institutions (in a large manner), or as international regimes (in a more restrictive sense).

There is present a strong connectivity between regimes, international organizations, and multilateral negotiations. One cannot separate them, without affecting all of them.

An international regime means more than a formula’s finding through an agreement concluding; the regimes could be seen as some “sorts of governmental arrangements”, which comprise “networks of principles, rules, and procedures which regulates behavior, and control its effects” (Keohane and Nye, 1977).

A scientist belonging to rationalist school of international relations underscores the great role of institutions and rules for international society to work smoothly, the general “imperative principles” guiding some persons or groups of persons to behave in a predetermined manner” (Bull, 1977).

To him, international institutions help interested states adhering to peculiar rules, following their formulation, communication, administration, implementation, interpretation, legitimization, and adaptation.

In this meaning, regimes mean much more than a simple temporary agreement which changes as a consequence of power capabilities' changing, and/or new interests' identification. Regimes and agreements are very different: while agreements are arrived at through a one-hit decision, the regimes' main aim is to facilitate concluding of agreements (Krasner, 1983). As Robert Jervis points out (in Krasner, 1983: 173), a "regime means more than norms and expectations which facilitate cooperation", aiming at a cooperation which crosses over the point focused only at unilateral short term gains.

Others authors, such as Puchala and Hopkins (in Krasner, 1983: 62) present regime as a phenomena influenced by its components which exert pressures upon behavior. It has *principles* (beliefs of facts and rectitude) regarding procedures for decisions' taking and *norms* (which proscribe or prescribe types of behavior). Each regime has its elites which are its actors; and the regime can appear in any field of international relations where there could be identified a behavior which can be squared in a peculiar framework. These can be identified reading Krasner's regime definition (Krasner, 1983): "international regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge" in a specific field of international relations.

But looking more closely, this is an incomplete definition; it doesn't take into account of the process concerning regime's operation, which sustains itself. In this angle, the Zartman's definition (in Spector and Zartman, 2003: 14) is more actual and more comprehensive; he points out that, international regimes are "continuous bi-dimensional negotiations carried on among sovereign states, in order to solve the coordination problem in the conditions of incertitude."

Furthermore, Zartman (in Spector and Zartman, 2003: 19) mentions that regimes become instruments of international cooperation – instruments for collective coordination and interdependencies' management.

Coordination and management are necessary, because they facilitate information's circulation for organizing the negotiation process, providing of standards, providing functions and roles, monitoring fulfillment of arrived at terms, conflict's reduction, and disputes' solving.

If the *principles* are beliefs of facts, rectitude, or causality, *norms* are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations, *rules* are prescriptions or proscriptions concerning future actions, while *procedures* for decision-making are agreed upon practices regarding the way collective actions are taken, and how they are implemented (Krasner, 1983). But Zartman sees a regime through a larger angle: a regime is much more than principles, norms, rules, procedures, and behaviors. It is an institutionalized effort which provides a real framework for these elements of the regime, and monitors them, providing a base for their fulfillment and sustaining. But here it must be mentioned that this institutionalization is an *international* one, and not a supranational one.

And here everyone could easily observe that there is a natural connection among international regimes, international institutions, and international multilateral negotiations.

In this way, the institutional framework provides a permanent forum for carrying on continuous multilateral negotiations under the umbrella of principles, norms, rules, and procedures which generate convergent behavior and expectations.

In this new angle, Cede (in Kremenyuk, 2002: 155) thinks that, the aim of international negotiations can be that of solving a divergent position through a regime's creation, which almost always is followed by institutional understandings and arrangements. And the results of negotiations carried on for the creation of a new international institution or a new international organization is an effort which belongs to the same category – that

of a new regime's creation. This is the reason why international regimes and international organizations appear as legal constructs. And Zartman (in Spector and Zartman, 2003: 26-29) says that they provide a permanent and formal framework which helps carrying on recursive multilateral negotiations which gives a peculiar dynamic and evolution to an international regime.

This evolution is due to previous experience and to the elements which gave the regime a peculiar feature, helping regime's maintaining on the one side, and to the following elements, on the other side: a) *reactions* given by regime's member states (which continuously are searching for maintaining or gaining or regaining through negotiations what they had won or hadn't won or had lost in the previous negotiations); b) the *cybernetic* series of links between domestic governance and international governance – this is because after the international negotiations had ended, the regime comes back to the participating states' domestic scene, where there would follow the implementation of the aspects convened at international level. And there are necessary new negotiations carried on at national level (in governmental agencies, where there could be registered pressures coming from society's side channeled by nongovernmental organizations). The results of these negotiations is a new set of elements which will be enforced as a consequence of previous negotiations, and a new entries which will be the subject of future international negotiations. This is both, a domestic reactions and an interaction, an integral component of the regime in evolution; c) *exogenous factors* involving accidents, unforeseen challenges, new information or acknowledgments, and other "influences" of changes coming from the outside

As we can observe, the regime's evolution is a continuous negotiation process, and the regime's evolution is realized through post-agreement negotiations. But this evolution of a regime through negotiations is facilitated by the existence of a formal and permanent framework provided by international organizations.

There was a case in history when there was a regime in being, but an international organization to provide a permanent formal framework for it, missed altogether. It is the case of colonialism, an era when the relations among great powers were regulated by a regime prescribing some sorts of behavior among main centers of colonialism and their behavior in relation with their colonial subjects. It was a geographically and functionally opaque regime, a pluralistic exercise obtained through reciprocal monitoring, in its greatest part being informal. There were just a few codified international rules concerning this regime, and for this reason a permanent international organization to help governing this regime, didn't existed.

The transformation for this regime took place in a revolutionary manner, due to a comprehensive changing of *principles* the governments were taking account when they conducted their international affairs. During '60s as a contra-regime was taking shape to counterbalance the old colonial regime, there were specified, legitimized, and institutionalized by UN General Assembly and its subsidiaries the norms prescribing decolonization. Personalities changed, norms were modified, power, and its distribution at international level had changed, too.

Conversely, a regime whose evolution is ensured by multilateral negotiations carried under a formal framework like an international organization is a very specific regime, not an opaque one; it is characterized by formality, not informality, its evolution being a step-by-step changing one, and not a revolutionary one.

Most of the international regimes took off after international conferences took place, when there were established international organizations which provided a permanent and expert framework for specific international aspects. It is the case of international institutions (organizations and regimes) in areas such: food, work and migration, trade, international finance and investments, health, weather, tourism, culture, communications (postal, telecommunications, and all types of transport).



Some international regimes appear in a larger framework provided by international organizations, and their evolution is ensured exactly by the presence of a permanent institution sustaining specific formal multilateral negotiations. The regimes' sustainability is due to general assembly of those institutions, their councils, congresses, or other organs belonging to international organizations, while their monitoring is ensured by the *international bureaucracy*. These are the regimes which are included in the family of *formal* regimes.

In a world composed by sovereign states, the main function of international regimes is that of states behavior's coordination in order to gain needed results in a specific domain of international relations; Keohane (in Krasner, 1983: 146) points that in the international system, the regimes birth as a result of voluntary agreements concluded among actors with equal power from legal point of view. The regime's existence helps concluding the agreements because they provide superior quality and quantity of information, while reducing the transaction costs, too. Furthermore, the cost for the creation of a regime would be reduced if there exists a formal communications among states; and the international organizations provide exactly this needed framework.

Oran Young (in Krasner, 1983: 93-97) specifies that an established path of behavior inevitably generates convergent expectations. This brings a conventionalized behavior which would give birth to recognized and acceptable norms, and if there could be identified actions and activities which could be connected among them, there should appear convergent norms and procedures.

Through interconnected activities' identification, there could be generated convergent norms and procedures. While creating transnational links, where elites have a central role – being practical actors on international stage – there could be provided a climate favorable to the negotiations' caring on. The post-negotiations become in this way negotiations "among friends, based upon the previous agreement, where the degree of understanding and the consensual knowledge's existence sustain a common framework for a peculiar problem and its solution. As mentioned by Spector (in Spector and Zartman, 2003: 80-81), the post agreement negotiations have a great chance to work smoothly, adapting themselves to previous agreement.

Working on and establishing a partial agreement by diplomats brings with it a continuous negotiation (permanent negotiation) under the aegis of an international forum, helping to continue the work previously started. Spector (in Spector and Zartman, 2003: 61) thinks that these future negotiations become in the most cases a major component of an international regime.

The continuity manifests in connection with parties' experience, too. As the negotiators have developed common expectations, have generated common norms and principles, and have thought about the effects of their choosing, the continuity becomes a *learning process*, parties learning to simulate a progressive advance for common problems' solving, through bypassing past mistakes, either through creative solution's proposal.

This learning process is facilitated especially by international organisms; they have a permanent character, and due to this peculiarity, the problems debated inside them receive a permanent character; the point which could not be successfully concluded in a specific moment could be resolved in a more favorable context in the future... Furthermore, new gained knowledge as a consequence of the learning process, changes in power and interests, and the benefits of innovation in technical field provide an international regime with the peculiarity of *continuity* and interests' satisfaction for its members, because there is a permanent framework for formal debating, where the actors involved can discuss these aspects. Their efforts would be directed using international organizations (public or private) from UN specialized agencies, to specialized forums, secretariats, centers, headquarters, councils, committees, or conferences.

Periodical meetings under the aegis of international organizations have the role of determining states to think and re-think their policies which would follow to be adopted, implemented, and to defend them. Puchala and Hopkins (in Krasner, 1983: 85) say that if the aim of the actors was regime's changing and this is a result of a learning process, then international institutions and organizations connected to a peculiar regime, became the classrooms.

Keohane (in Krasner, 1983: 170) says that regimes and the formal debates which assure through continuous negotiations their evolution are requested and appear in domains where: there is a high density of problems; regimes are capable to develop generalized working norms and provide high quality information to political leaders.

High problems' density demands concluding of agreements, sustaining cooperation and actors actions' coordination; as problems multiply, and as their complexity is rising and have a deeper impact, the demand for agreements rises dramatically. And as these agreements multiply, the international regime's and organization's building is more pressing. Using these international institutions mean reducing transactional costs, providing specific information, in the same time, too.

But international regimes aren't quasi-governments – imperfects trying for the institutionalization of a relationship, with a central authority in global politics. Lowry says that regimes close (in Samuels, 1979: 276) more to contracts, involving actors who had established their long term interests, trying to structure the relationship among them in a stable, predictable, and in a mutual advantageously manner.

Regimes are like quasi-agreements, where their rules are frequently changed or cancelled in order to fit them to the moment's exigencies. Their most important function is to establish mutual stable expectations regarding the way of behavior of others and to develop working relations which would sustain actors' adaptation practices to newer situations.

As international regimes' rules rarely enter in force automatically, they become the object of future negotiations and re-negotiations, after the initial agreement had been concluded. The problems encountered at international stage aren't static and the solutions for them, too; while the power and interests of agreement's signatories (and a regime's members) are fluid. International actors are conforming to an international regime's elements, but in the same time they are trying to change the regime's norms and rules through adaptation, in order to serve their new perceived interests, and their way to solve their problems.

In order to be sustainable in the long run, international regimes have to register an evolution: this evolution must be based upon a process of continuous and permanent negotiations; that for "regimes birth as a consequence of negotiation process", and they enter the evolution phase only through post-agreement negotiations, as pointed by Spector and Zartman (in Spector and Zartman, 2003: 4).

## **In conclusion**

International regimes help coordinating problems encountered by actors at international stage. And this *coordination* takes place through the *negotiations*, when there are analyzed elements which influence actors' behavior and the way they are searching for adapting to the new situations' peculiarity.

These negotiations have a *multilateral character*, and the *elites* and international organizations' existence, having a permanent character, become the formulas and frameworks which sustain a permanent contact among international actors. While the negotiations' carrying on resembles the character of continuity.

We can easily note the strong and direct connection among *international organizations*, *international regimes*, and *multilateral diplomacy*, and the way its key-function –

multilateral negotiation manifests. Specifically, the multilateral negotiation carried on under the aegis of international organization “has the character of a process concerning the construction of a regime; it doesn’t foresee the values’ distribution or redistribution in a direct manner, but is focused upon the general accepted *criteria* to establish values’ distribution, or for the performances’ evaluation in a peculiar context” Sjostedt (in Kremenyuk, 2002: 363).

And it is noteworthy to be mentioned that “international regime” isn’t synonymous with “international organization”, although in most of the cases, international regimes are closely followed by international organizations which aim at supporting them, in different ways (Young, 1989).

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